This paper investigates the association between population age structure, particularly the share of the population in the "prime saving years" 45-60, and the returns on stocks and bonds. The paper is motivated by the claim that the aging of the "Baby Boom" cohort in the United States is a key factor in explaining the recent rise in asset values. It also addresses the associated claim that asset prices will decline when this large cohort reaches retirement age and begins to reduce its asset holdings. This paper begins by considering household age-asset accumulation profiles. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances suggest that while cross-sectional age-wealth profiles peak for households in their early 60s, cohort data on the asset ownership of the same households show a much less pronounced peak. Wealthy households with substantial asset holdings appear to decumulate slowly, if at all, after retirement. This casts doubt on the "asset sell off" view, at least for the share of assets (excluding defined benefit pension assets) that households control directly. The paper then considers the historical relationship between demographic structure and real returns on Treasury bills, long-term government bonds, and corporate stock. The results do not suggest any robust relationship between demographic structure and asset returns. This is partly due to the limited power of statistical tests based on the few "effective degrees of freedom" in the historical record of age structure and asset returns in the United States and other developed economies. The paper concludes by discussing factors such as international capital flows and forward-looking behavior on the part of market participants that could weaken the relationship between age structure and asset returns in a single nation.
The Baby Boom generation, those born in roughly the two decades following World War II, has had and will continue to have important effects on the U.S. economy. Fair and Dominguez (1991) explore the impact of aggregate population age structure on various macroeconomic relationships, with particular emphasis on those involving consumption and saving behavior. The prospective aging of the Baby Boomers will substantially increase the number of Social Security and Medicare recipients in the years following 2010. The difficulty of accommodating the growth in benefit flows without substantial "pre-funding" has led to current discussions of both Medicare and Social Security reform, and more generally to an analysis of how population aging affects the optimal level of national saving (Cutler, et al. (1989) ).
One of the central issues in evaluating whether the Baby Boom cohort is financially prepared for retirement concerns the adequacy of personal retirement saving. This issue, in turn, hinges on both the rate at which currently working households are saving, and the rate of return that these households are likely to earn on their retirement saving. A number of studies suggest that this rate of return may in fact be affected by the aging of the Baby Boomers. The saving and portfolio behavior of the Baby Boom cohort has been cited as a factor contributing to recent financial market movements. The entry of the Baby Boom cohort into its "peak saving years," and the associated increase in the demand for financial assets, is often cited as an explanation of the rise in stock market values during the 1990s. This hypothesis has been developed in several academic studies, including Bergantino (1998) , Brooks (1998) , and Schieber and Shoven (1997) .
It has also featured in popular accounts of asset market movements, including Passell (1996) and Sterling and Waite (1998) . In many ways the current discussion of population age structure and equity values parallels the debate a decade ago, stimulated by the work of Mankiw and Weil (1989) , on how changing numbers of households in the "homebuying years" of the late twenties and thirties may have contributed to the rise of real house prices during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and to a prospective decline in real house prices in future decades.
Assertions that middle-aged Baby Boomers have bid up prices of stocks and other real assets are often accompanied by predictions that when Boomers reach retirement age, their concerted decision to sell assets will result in declining asset values. Siegel (1998) summarizes this argument when he writes "The words "Sell? Sell to whom?" might haunt the baby boomers in the next century. Who are the buyers of the trillions of dollars of boomer assets? The [baby boomer generation] … threatens to drown in financial assets. The consequences could be disastrous not only for the boomers' retirement but also for the economic health of the entire population.(p. 41)" Schieber and Shoven (1997) develop the same argument in their analysis of the link between demographic structure and the pattern of inflows and outflows from defined benefit pension plans.
They note that the magnitude of any such effect is uncertain, depending on a host of factors including the degree of international capital market integration. They nevertheless suggest that "when the pension system begins to be a net seller [of assets] ... in the third decade of the next century ... this could depress asset prices, particularly since the demographic structure of the United States does not differ that greatly from Japan and Europe ... what we think may happen is high real interest rates, which could depress the prices of stocks, bonds, land, and real estate.(p.25)".
While the potential link between demographic structure and asset returns is widely discussed, there have been few systematic studies of the historical relationship between these variables. Both Bergantino (1998) and Brooks (1998) report suggestive evidence linking the level of real stock prices to the fraction of the population in the "prime saving years," which are typically defined as ages 40-65. Bergantino (1998) focuses on the experience in the United States, while Brooks (1998) also considers demographics and equity prices in other OECD nations.
Because there is a strong correlation across countries in low-frequency movements in equity values, however, the international evidence does not represent a set of independent draws. This paper presents new empirical evidence on the relationship between population age structure and asset market performance. It focuses on the returns on Treasury bills, long-term corporate bonds, and corporate stock over the last seventy years. It differs from previous empirical studies in that it focuses on how demographics affect returns, rather than the level of stock prices. This paper addresses a simple question: do average asset returns vary with changes in demographic structure? The empirical analysis pays particular attention to the robustness of these relationships, and to the difficulty of choosing amongst the wide range of alternative demographic variables that are available to the data analyst.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first develops a stylized model indicating how demographic changes can affect rates of return on various assets, and it summarizes previous research on demographic structure and asset returns. The second section describes the age structure of asset holdings in the current U.S. economy. It also presents survey-based information on the relationship between age and risk tolerance. Section three presents summary information on the historical correlation between various demographic variables and returns on bills, bonds, and stocks. The results suggest little if any relationship between demographic structure, or the change in demographic structure, and asset returns. Section four reports corroborative evidence from Canada and the United Kingdom; in neither case does the post-war return experience suggest a strong effect of age structure on asset returns. The final section concludes with a discussion of various factors that may account for the apparently weak relationship between age structure and return patterns.
Demography and Asset Prices: Theoretical Framework and Previous Empirical Research
This section explores the effect of changing age structure on asset demands in a stylized economy. It then describes the empirical literature that has explored the impact of age structure on the level of share prices and the realized returns on corporate stock.
Age Structure and Equilibrium Returns
To formalize the effect of changing asset demand on asset returns, consider a closed economy in which households live for three periods (Bohn (1998) carries out a related exercise in a two-period overlapping generations economy). The young (y) and middle-aged (m) each supply one unit of labor to the market, while the old (o) do not work. The three age groups have fixed demands for financial assets given by S y , S m , and S o , and the number of persons in each age group is given by N y , N m , and N o , respectively. The total portfolio demand for capital in this economy, or alternatively the supply of savings, is given by
The production sector is described by a constant-returns production function, so the rate of return to capital is a function of the capital labor ratio:
In this case N = N y + N m , and
Now consider the effect of various demographic changes in this setting. First consider a population shift from the young to the middle-aged group, with dN y = -dN m . Such a shift does not affect the labor force, so the only effect on the rate of return is through the desired holding of assets. Differentiating (2) yields
Since f" < 0, provided S m > S y , so that middle-aged households hold more financial assets than young households, this demographic shift would reduce the equilibrium return on capital.
Now consider a second demographic shock, a shift from middle-aged to older workers, again with a fixed total population. In this case dN m = -dN o . Because older workers are not in the labor force, a rise in the elderly fraction of the population has two effects: it alters the per capita demand for financial assets, and it also changes the size of the labor force. This implies that
If old households and middle-aged households hold the same levels of financial assets (S m = S o ), then a population shift from the middle-aged to the older group unambiguously reduces the return to capital through its effect on the capital-labor ratio. If older households demand more financial assets than their middle-aged counterparts, this effect is reinforced. In the case when older households hold less financial assets than middle-aged households, however, the effect of the age shift on returns is ambiguous, because the age shift reduces both capital and labor in the economy.
The resulting change in asset returns will depend on the empirical magnitude of these two effects.
The simple model sketched above ignores several potentially important channels through which demographic shocks might affect returns. First, the model does not allow shifts in returns, or wages, to alter households' age-specific wealth holdings. If desired asset holdings are sensitive to rates of return, this would involve replacing S y with S y (r), with similar changes for other age groups. If the demand for assets was very elastic with respect to the interest rate, then small changes in asset returns would lead to large adjustments in the capital stock, and there would be a small change in the equilibrium return as a result of demographic shifts. The current empirical literature on the aggregate interest elasticity of saving suggests relatively small effects, but there is relatively little information on how changes in prospective returns alter the age-specific saving rates of different households.
A second limitation of the model is its focus on a closed economy. If the country in question was part of an integrated world capital market, in particular if it were a "small open economy," then the world interest rate would determine returns. Shifts in the demand for financial assets that resulted from demographic change would affect the amount of capital owned by the country's residents, but not the capital-labor ratio used in production. The rate of return would not depend on the demographic mix within the nation. The degree to which world capital markets are integrated, and hence the importance of this modeling assumption, remains an open question.
While there are vast cross-border financial flows in fixed income markets, there is still a substantial "home bias" in equity ownership. French and Poterba (1991) present evidence showing that more than ninety percent of the equity assets of investors in the United States and Japan are held in their domestic equity markets. Feldstein and Horioka (1980 ), Frankel (1991 ), and Taylor (1996 document substantial correlation between national saving and national investment rates. These relationships make the effect of a change in a country's domestic saving rate and desired asset holdings on the equilibrium return on its capital stock an open issue. The ambiguity concerning the appropriate framework in which to consider shifts in asset demand in part motivates the empirical analysis of demographic structure and asset returns that follows.
A final difficulty with this simple model is that it focuses on steady states and does not recognize the adjustment process between one steady state and another. In particular, it does not incorporate forward-looking behavior in the pricing of capital assets. When capital goods last for longer than one period, a well-functioning asset market will price these goods so that their market price equals the expected present discounted value of their future earnings. Because demographic shifts between young, middle-aged, and old workers are predictable as soon as the size of a birth cohort is revealed, there would be no "surprise" adjustment of asset prices as large cohorts aged.
Rather, the adjustment of asset prices would take place as soon as the size of this group's birth cohort became public information. Such an analysis suggests that in the case of the Baby Boom cohort, the news about the future pattern of asset prices was revealed when the Baby Boom was born, and not in the 1990s, when the older members of the cohort turned 50. If the evolving demographic structure affected the equilibrium required return in the economy, asset prices could still fluctuate as the age structure changed, but one would not expect the stark price adjustments that some "popular" accounts of the link between demography and asset returns suggest.
Previous Empirical Literature on Equity Markets and Population Age Structure
A small but growing literature has explored the link between stock returns and population age structure. The first systematic study of this issue, by Bakshi and Chen (1994) and stock returns for their data sample. They also show that there is a positive relationship in both developed and developing countries between stock returns and the change in the average age of a country's inhabitants. This pattern emerges both in cross-sectional data, and in an analysis of timeseries cross-section data. While these results suggest a possible link between demography and asset returns, other interpretations are also possible. Since the increase in average age could proxy for changes in underlying economic conditions that reduce morbidity and mortality, it is not clear whether demographic changes should be viewed as the driving force behind asset market movements. Asset market movements may signal that other factors are present in a nation, and these factors may in turn affect demographic structure.
A third study that presents related information, for only the U.S. stock market, is Macunovich (1997) . This study presents regression equations that "explain" postwar movements in the real return on the Dow Jones Industrial Average using nearly a dozen variables on population age structure. The explanatory power of these regressions is substantial. As some of the results presented below suggest, however, these findings may be due to the presence of many different trend variables in the regression model. This leads to "overfitting" of the stock return time series, and to out-of-sample predictions that are sensitive to small changes in specification.
Two additional studies that provide important evidence on asset returns and population age structure are Brooks (1998) and Bergantino (1998) . The former relates the level of equity prices in a range of OECD nations to a simple set of demographic variables. The fraction of individuals in a population who are between the ages of 40 and 65 appears to be positively correlated with the level of share prices. Bergantino's (1998) study is similar, but it focuses on the United States experience. It develops estimates of age-specific asset demands, and then uses these demands along with changing demographic structure to construct estimates of time-varying demand for financial assets. The findings suggest a clear relationship between the level of age-specific asset demand and the level of stock prices, and between the difference in asset prices and differences in "demographic demand" over multi-year horizons.
There are two important difficulties with the empirical strategy that underlies these studies.
First, both the level of stock prices and the level of "demographic demand" are strongly trending variables. A first-order autoregression fit to annual data on the level of demographic-predicted equity demand, as defined later in the present paper, has an estimated coefficient of 0.9725 (0.0079) for the 1926-1997 sample period. A similar first order autoregression on the level of real stock prices has a coefficient of 1.179 (0.023) for the 1926-1997 period. This suggests that both of these variables are integrated processes, and work beginning with Granger and Newbold (1974) has shown the dangers of "spurious regressions" between two integrated processes. At a minimum, this suggests that the apparent correlation between these variables may be less statistically significant than conventional tests would suggest.
Second, the use of annual data, or even multi-year differenced data, may provide an illusion of more degrees of freedom than actually apply to the problem at hand. There is one Baby Boom shock in U.S. demographic history, at least during the period when there have been well developed, broad-based financial markets for securities such as corporate stock. As the Baby Boom cohort has approached age 50, real stock market wealth has risen rapidly. This is consistent with some variants of the demographic demand hypothesis. However, it is important to recognize that the postwar years represent essentially "one observation" on how demographic shocks affect asset returns. The difficulty of evaluating the limited low-frequency variation in demographic structure is related to the problems of testing for low-frequency patterns in stock returns. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1996) provide a discussion of these issues.
The limitations of these studies suggest the potential value of further empirical analysis.
The work below considers how demographic structure is related to the returns on volatile assets, such as corporate stock, as well as the returns on less risky securities. It also focuses on returns, rather than the level of asset prices, to avoid the spurious regression problems noted above.
Age Patterns in Asset Ownership
Behind all discussions of how demographic changes may affect asset markets, there is an assumption that there are pronounced age patterns in the ownership of financial assets. This could occur through differences in the direct ownership of financial assets, or through differences in the ownership of assets through pension plans and related retirement saving accounts. This section presents summary information on age patterns in direct household asset ownership. It does not consider assets held in defined benefit pension funds, which have received particular attention in Schieber and Shoven (1997) . There is little doubt that "implicit assets" in corporate defined benefit pension plans peaks near retirement. These assets decline mechanically thereafter, since the pension benefits are paid out as an annuity, the value of which declines as the household ages.
Age-Asset Profiles in the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances
The most comprehensive information on asset ownership in the United States is provided by the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is conducted by the Federal Reserve Board.
The first "modern" SCF was conducted in 1983, and the survey has been carried out every three years since then. The most recent survey for which data are publicly available was carried out in 1995. Kennickell, Starr-McLuer, and Sunden (1997) provide a detailed description of the SCF, along with summary tabulations from the most recent survey.
The Survey of Consumer Finances can be used to measure average levels of asset holdings for individuals in different age groups. The basic unit of observation in the survey is the household, and most households include several adult members. To construct age-specific asset profiles, I have allocated half of the assets held by married couples to each member of the couple.
Thus, if a married couple in which the husband is 62 and the wife is 57 holds $250,000 in financial assets, this will translate into $125,000 held by a 62-year-old, and $125,000 held by a 57-year-old.
There are two ways to describe the relationship between age and asset ownership. than individuals who were born in more recent years. Comparing the age-specific asset holdings of different age groups at a given point in time may therefore provide an unreliable guide to the change in asset holdings that will take place as current cohorts age. Table 1 reports average holdings of common stock, net financial assets, and individual net worth, by net worth, for individuals in different five-year age groups in 1995. The table shows that there are important age-related differences in the levels of assets and in net worth. The table focuses on mean holdings, which are much higher than median holdings at all ages. Average holdings of net financial assets rise with an individual's age for those between their early 30s and those in their early 60s. There is a decline in the rate of increase in financial asset holdings for individuals at older ages, but there is no evident decline in net financial assets when we compare those above age 75 with those in somewhat younger age groups. This finding is somewhat different from the sharper decline in Sabelhaus and Pence (1998) . The difference appears to be due to disparities in the set of assets considered in the two studies, and potentially also to differences in the treatment of mortality and its impact on wealth holding.
A similar pattern emerges with respect to both corporate stock and net worth. Older individuals exhibit larger asset holdings than younger ones, but there is only a limited downturn in average asset holdings at older ages. There is some downturn in holdings of corporate stock, where the age-specific ownership peaks between the ages of 55 and 59 at $38,319, and declines by nearly $10,000 for those in the next two age categories. (The imprecision of the age-specific asset holdings makes it difficult, however, to reject the null hypothesis that stock holding is constant at ages above 55.) Net worth, which includes financial assets as well as holdings of owner-occupied real estate, other real property, equity in unincorporated businesses, and assets held through defined contribution pension plans, rises up to age 55, and then stays relatively constant for the remainder of an individual's lifetime.
As noted above, it is difficult to interpret a cross-sectional age-asset profile like that in Table 1 because of the confounding effects of age and cohort effects. If older cohorts have lower lifetime earnings than younger cohorts, and if the accumulation of financial assets is correlated with lifetime earnings, then we could observe lower asset holdings at older ages even if households did not draw down assets in their old age. Alternatively, if older households had higher lifetime earnings on average than their younger counterparts, it would be possible to observe a rising ageasset profile at all ages, even if older households did reduce their asset holdings as they aged.
To explore the pure "age effect" on asset accumulation, I use repeated cross-sections of the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1983 Finances from , 1986 Finances from , 1989 Finances from , 1992 , and 1995 to estimate age profiles of asset ownership allowing for different lifetime asset levels for different birth cohorts. The empirical specification models ASSETS it , the level of assets (or some specific type of asset) held by group I in period t as:
where β j denotes the "pure" age effect on ownership of a given asset category, and α k denotes a birth-cohort specific intercept term that captures the level of assets held by different birth cohorts.
The β j coefficients can be interpreted as the best predictor of how movements from one age group to another will change the asset holdings of different groups. Poterba and Samwick (1997) present detailed findings, using this method, for a range of different asset classes. Ameriks and Zeldes (1998) use panel data on individual households to analyze related questions on portfolio structure as households age. Table 2 presents the estimates of the age effects from (5) for the three asset categories considered in Table 1 . The patterns are similar, and they can be interpreted as lifecycle trajectories of asset holding. The results provide clear evidence that holdings of common stock and total financial assets increase as individuals age, but once again the decline in assets as individuals enter old age is much less pronounced than the increase in asset holdings during middle age. For equities, for example, real holdings of common stock peak between the ages of 55 and 59, at $32,515. They decline to $28,219 for those between the ages of 70 and 74, and further, to $24,722, for those over the age of 75. For net financial assets there is virtually no decline in old age, with peak holdings between the ages of 70 and 74, and for net worth, the peak occurs between 65 and 69 with a notable decline by age 75+. The finding of a limited decline in financial asset holdings as individuals age is important, since it suggests that the rush to sell financial assets that underlies predictions of "market meltdown" in 2020 or 2030 may be less pronounced than some analysts have suspected. The results in both Tables 1 and 2 suggest that there are substantial increases in asset holdings as households move through their 30s and 40s, which suggests that the aging of the Baby Boom cohort to date may have had an impact on the demand for financial assets.
One issue about the data in Tables 1 and 2 that bears note is the fact that these tables report individual, not household, asset holdings. For most of the lifecycle, dividing household assets equally across adult members of the household seems like the natural way to generate a reliable age profile of asset holdings. For individuals in their 70s and 80s, however, mortality can have an important effect on the measured trajectory of asset holding. This can occur in several ways. First, there is clear evidence (see Rogot et al. (1992) ) that individuals in high net worth households have lower mortality rates than those with lower net worth or lower lifetime income. This suggests that the individuals who survive to advanced ages may be a selected group, biased toward a higher net worth part of the population. Second, when one member of a married couple dies, the couple's assets will typically flow to the surviving spouse. This can raise the net worth of the survivor relative to what it would have been when this individual's spouse was still alive. Finally, it is not clear how one should model the effect of death of a surviving spouse, and bequest of assets to younger heirs, on the demand for financial assets. There is relatively little information available on whether those who receive inheritances save their funds, and thereby continue to hold assets, or use the funds to finance higher consumption.
The analysis of financial asset holdings in Tables 1 and 2 ignores assets that are accumulated through defined benefit pension funds. Schieber and Shoven's (1997) analysis of population aging and asset demand emphasizes the almost mechanical accumulation, and then decumulation, of assets that occurs as individuals age in a defined benefit pension regime. In most cases, the value of the assets that are accumulated in defined benefit plans peaks when an individual retires. As benefits are paid out, the actuarial present value of the remaining payouts declines, and the assets needed to provide these benefits decline. This implies that there is a substantial force of accumulation, and then decumulation, as a large birth cohort moves through its lifecycle. The open question concerns how such an age transition affects financial asset values.
Risk Tolerance and Age Structure
One particular aspect of the aging process that emerges in some previous discussions of demography and asset values concerns individual risk tolerance. Bakshi and Chen (1994) justify their inclusion of age variables in Euler equations relating consumption growth on the grounds that older individuals are less risk tolerant than younger individuals. They reason that changes in the age structure of the population should therefore affect the equilibrium risk-return tradeoff that is reflected in market prices.
The Survey of Consumer Finances provides some direct evidence on age patterns in risk aversion. Respondents are asked to describe their views about risk and return. In particular they are asked whether they are prepared to accept "substantial risk in pursuit of substantially aboveaverage returns," "above average risk in return for above-average returns," "average risk for average returns," or virtually no risk in pursuit of higher investment returns. Table 3 shows the resulting breakdown of responses, tabulated by the age of the head of the household responding to the SCF. The table is divided into two parts. The first shows the responses of the self-selected subset of individuals who hold corporate stock, while the second shows the responses for the entire population. Not surprisingly, the investors who hold some stocks are more prepared to take risk than are their non-equity-investing counterparts. This is particularly evident in the much higher fraction of the general population that indicates an unwillingness to take any risk in pursuit of higher returns.
The table shows that age is indeed related to risk tolerance. There is a substantial difference between the fraction of households headed by individuals who are younger than 65, and the fraction headed by individuals older than 65, in the willingness to take some risk in return for higher average returns. There are no clear patterns among younger individuals. These findings provide some support for the analysis that underlies the Bakshi and Chen (1994) study, and they provide a justification for further empirical analysis of the links between population age structure and asset returns. They should not be viewed as dispositive, however. Barsky, et al. (1997) analyze age-related patterns in risk aversion for individuals in the Health and Retirement Survey.
While they find some differences in risk aversion across age groups, they do not find a monotonic relationship with age. These data on risk aversion suggest that simple summary measures, such as the median age in the adult population, may not be the appropriate variable for analysis. Instead, these data suggest that the fraction of the population over the age of 65 may be the more natural variable to consider. , 1950-2050 To briefly sketch the demographic transition that is currently taking place in the United States, Table 4 This fraction is not substantially higher than the value in 1970 (42.3 percent). Moreover, the absolute value of the recent change is comparable to the decline in the share of the adult population in late middle age that occurred in the early 1970s as the Baby Boom cohort reached adulthood.
Changing Demographic Patterns

Integrating Age-Specific Asset Demands and Changing Demographic Structure
The information on age-specific asset holdings suggests that asset demands rise when households age, but it does not suggest a downturn in asset holdings at the end of the lifecycle. To illustrate the impact of population aging on the demand for financial assets, where ASSETS i denotes the age-specific asset holdings shown in Table 1 , and N it denotes the Census projection (or actual value) for the number of individuals of age I in year t. Table 5 shows that projected asset demand for common stock and for financial assets more generally, as well as projected household net worth, rises in the four decades between 1980 and 2020. The table presents data using the cohort approach to estimating age profiles for asset accumulation, as well as the more traditional "cross-sectional" approach discussed above. There was a small projected decline in both common stock holdings, and in net worth, in the two decades preceding 1980s; this reflected the rising importance of young households, who have relatively low levels of asset holdings. The table also shows an expansion of assets per capita over the next three decades. The growth rate of assets per capita declines after 2030, but there is no absolute decline in per capita holdings of financial assets or corporate stock after that date.
The findings in Table 5 , and the data that they are based on in Tables 1 and 2 , suggest that the textbook model of a "lifecycle consumer" accumulating assets while working, and then drawing these assets down in retirement, does not provide an accurate description of average asset accumulation profiles. This finding is consistent with a number of other studies on saving behavior; see Hurd (1990) for a survey. Even if most households draw down their assets in retirement, the average value of financial assets may not decline at older ages. This is because, as Poterba and Samwick (1995) report, the ownership of financial assets is highly concentrated. The wealthiest ten percent of households hold roughly seventy percent of household financial assets excluding corporate stock, and nearly ninety percent of corporate stock. Thus the asset decumulation behavior of a small set of households is likely to be the primary determinant of agespecific asset balances.
Demographic Variables and Population Age Structure
The foregoing analysis suggests that it is difficult to choose a single measure of demographic structure as "the variable" that should affect asset returns. Rather than trying to make an arbitrary choice among such variables, this section presents empirical results that exploit a range of different potential measures of demographic structure. The section is divided into three sub-sections. The first presents bivariate regression results relating asset returns to several summary measures of population structure, such as the median age variable that was used by Bakshi and Chen (1994) . The next sub-section uses information on the "projected assets" defined at the end of the last section, and relates changes in this demand variable to asset returns. Finally, the empirical results in the last sub-section are based on a "nonparametric" approach in which several different variables, the logs of the shares of the population in various ten-year age intervals, are simultaneously used to proxy for demographic structure. While the collinearity between shares makes it difficult to focus on any individual coefficient in the resulting regression specification, it is possible to test the joint significance of the demographic variables in explaining asset returns, and to make projections based on these models.
Age Structure and Asset Returns: Summary Evidence
In its simplest form, the hypothesis that population age structure and the associated age- information on returns on both relatively low-volatility assets (Treasury bills) and more risky assets. Considering several different assets also allows for the possibility that age-related patterns in the demand for particular assets (such as equities) lead to more pronounced demographic effects for some assets than for others. The rationale for considering different sample periods is to develop some evidence on the robustness of the findings. Table 6 presents the estimated ß j coefficients from regression models of the form:
(7) R i,t = a + ß j *(DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLE) j,t + e i,t where R i,t denotes the real return on asset i in year t, and (DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLE) j,t denotes the value of one of the demographic variables defined in the last section.
The results for the long sample period provide at best limited support for a link between asset returns and demographic structure, and only in the markets for fixed income securities. Of the fifteen reported coefficients (five demographic measures and three return variables), only four are statistically significant at conventional levels. These are the coefficients on the fraction of the population between the ages of 40 and 64, in equations for the yields on Treasury bills or the total return on government bonds, with this population group scaled either by the total population or the adult population. In each case the estimated coefficients are negative, suggesting that an increase in the fraction of the population in the key asset-accumulating years reduces required returns and thereby lowers observed returns. The corresponding coefficient on corporate stock returns is positive, although the standard error is too large to permit precise inferences.
The estimated effects of these variables are substantively significant as well as statistically Three conclusions emerge from Table 6 . First, most measures of population age structure do not appear to be correlated with asset returns on bonds, bills, or equities. Second, the results are not robust across sub-sample periods, and the estimated coefficients vary significantly between the post-war and interwar periods. Finally, there is essentially no evidence of a link between demographic structure and equity markets, although that is the market in which the recent shift in age structure is most often advanced as an explanation for observed returns.
The conceptual model that underlies the equations that are presented in Table 6 is one in which the required return on assets is a function of the age structure and associated asset demand in the population. It is consistent with the simple theoretical framework presented earlier, provided adjustment to a new steady state is very rapid. If adjustment is slow, however, it is possible that the change in the population share in key asset-buying age categories may "explain" observed returns. This approach ignores the possibility that changes in demography are predictable, and that the change in a given year or several year period conveys little "news" to asset markets.
The explanatory power of a "demographic change" specification is nevertheless an open empirical question. Table 7 presents results that address this issue. In this table annual returns are related to annual changes in the demographic variables. The dependent variables in these specifications are the same as those in Table 6 . The independent variables in Table 7 are simply the annual differences of the independent variables that were studied in Table 6 . Once again, the variable involving the percentage of the population in the age 40-64 category is the strongest explanatory variable. The change in this population share has a statistically significant effect in explaining both bond and bill yields, but the coefficient is now the opposite of that in the level equations. A within-year increase in the share of the population between the ages of 40 and 64 is positively correlated with the T-bill yield and with the return on government bonds. The estimated coefficients are relatively stable across different subsamples, and imply a substantively significant effect on asset returns. A one half of one percentage point increase in the 40-64 population share (which is a very large change in the independent variable) would correspond to a 234 basis point increase in the T-bill yield, and to a nearly 700 basis point change in the return on long-term government bonds. This may seem implausibly large to many readers.
There is also some evidence in the post-war period of a positive correlation between the change in the share of the age 20+ population that is between the ages of 40 and 64, and the return on common stock. The inconsistency between the results in Tables 6 and 7 also casts doubt on the general robustness of any links between demographic structure and asset returns. Tables 6 and 7 .
The specifications in Table 8 are not estimated on annual data, as the earlier equations were, but rather are estimated using data on five-year non-overlapping "interval observations." The rationale for exploring such a specification is that the relationship between demographic factors and returns may not be driven by high-frequency variation, but rather by low-frequency movements. Studying the relationship between five-year average returns and five-year averages of, or five year changes in, the demographic variables places greater weight on low-frequency movements than the specifications in Tables 6 and 7 .
The results are broadly consistent with those in the previous two tables. For most of the demographic variables, such as median age and the average age of those over 19, the estimated coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero. There is some evidence that the population between the ages of 40 and 64 is correlated with returns, with effects in the directions found above: negative for the level of population share, positive for changes. These findings are generally supportive of the use of annual data for the regression models.
To summarize the information from Tables 6 and 7 , and to illustrate the potential effects of changes in demographic structure in the next half century, Table 9 reports the fitted values (withinsample predictions) as well as out-of-sample predictions for asset returns. These fitted and predicted values are calculated using the estimated coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 along with data on demographic projections from the Census Bureau, as reported in Table 4 . The estimated models make some rather strange predictions. Consider, for example, the results in the middle column, which reports the predictions from equations in which the explanatory variable is the level or change in the percentage of the population between the ages of 40 and 64. In the level specification, the predicted yield on T-bills falls to -12 percent in 2010, and it is negative throughout the 2010-2050 period. The change specification yields more plausible results. In this case the predicted real yield on T-bills is predicted to fall to seventy basis points in 2010, and effectively to zero after 2030. For long-term bond returns, the level specification also yields sharply negative predicted returns in the early part of the next century, along with more modestly negative returns for most of the century. These extreme predictions cast doubt on the level specification as a useful device for exploring the links between asset returns and demographic structure.
For equity returns, the various demographic variables generate a range of different predictions regarding prospective returns. The estimates in the upper panel of Table 9 , which are based on level specifications for the demographic variables, suggest rising real equity returns in the case when median age is the explanatory variable, but show some decline in equity returns for most of the other demographic variables. The large standard errors of prediction for all of these estimates, however, underscore the difficulty of drawing any firm conclusions on the basis of these empirical models. The results in the lower panel, which are based on empirical models in which the change in the demographic variable is the independent variable, are more likely to project declines than increases in the real equity return between 1990 and 2030, but once again, the standard errors are large. With out-of-sample standard errors of prediction on the order of .20, it is difficult to draw any conclusion from projected differences of .02 or .03 in real equity returns.
"Demographic Projected Asset Demand" and Returns
The analysis in the last sub-section imposed relatively little structure on the relationship between demographic change and asset returns. The discussion of age-specific asset demands in the Survey of Consumer Finances, however, provides a more structured approach to investigating how asset returns are affected by demographic change. It is possible to relate asset returns to the level of, or the change in, the "projected asset demand" variable that was presented in Table 5 .
This variable uses evidence on the age-specific evolution of asset holdings, along with information on the age structure of the population in various years, to form a "predicted" measure of asset demand. It is therefore a way of formalizing the possible links between changes in the population of various ages and the desire to hold financial assets. Table 10 reports the result of estimating regression models in which the returns on bills, bonds, and stocks are related to the level of the projected asset demand variable, or the difference in this variable. The table reports a number of different specifications, corresponding to different sample periods and including some results from the five-year average or difference specification.
The table also shows the findings from three different measures of projected asset demand. The first is based on age-specific patterns of corporate stock ownership, the second on age-specific ownership of net financial assets, and the third on age-specific net worth. These variables correspond to the time series shown in Table 5 . If risk-adjusted returns are the same for all securities, then a broad-based measure of asset demand, such as that for household net worth, should be the best predictor of asset returns. If there is some segmentation across markets, however, the projected demand variable based on common stock may have more predictive power for equity returns, and net financial assets might be best at tracking fixed income returns.
The results suggest very limited linkage between any of the projected demand variables and the realized patterns of asset returns. This is particularly true for the full sample estimates. None of the estimated coefficients relating returns to the level or to the change in projected asset demand, using either the cross-sectional or the cohort approaches to generating projected asset demand, are statistically significant at standard significance levels. There is some, limited evidence of a positive relationship between the change in projected asset demand and the level of asset returns, particularly for common stock returns, in the specifications that employ five-year non-overlapping changes in asset demand. When the cohort estimates of asset demands at different ages are used to create the projected asset demand variable, there is a significant and positive association between the changes in the asset demand variable calculated using equity holdings, net financial assets, and net worth, and the level of equity returns. There is also some evidence for a correlation between equity returns and changes in these asset demand variables in the post-1947 sample period. In spite of these correlations, however, the general pattern of results in Table 10 confirms the earlier conclusion that there is at best a weak, and not particularly robust, relationship between demographic structure and asset returns in the post-1926 U.S. experience.
Further Evidence Using Detailed Information on Age Structure
While the last subsection moved toward a more structured relationship between demographics and asset returns, some might argue that none of the empirical work presented above allows enough flexibility to uncover the patterns that link asset returns to demographic variables.
In particular, Macunovich (1997) reports results that appear to use demographic variables to track movements in the real value of the stock market throughout the postwar period, and her approach is essentially a "nonparametric" one in which various age groups' shares of the aggregate population are used as independent variables. To explore the power of such equations, this subsection uses such variables to explain the real returns on bills, bonds, and stocks. Table 11 reports results of regression models that include nine distinct demographic variables as explanatory variables. These are the logarithms of the shares of the population in nine different age groups: < 5, 5-14, 15-24, …, 65-74, and 75+ . If a population composed of individuals in their 40s and 50s is associated with higher asset returns, then the coefficients on these variables should be positive. If a population with many individuals above the age of 65 tends to draw down assets, then the coefficients on these age share variables should be negative.
The results provide some evidence for the full sample period that a larger population in the 65-74 age group is associated with lower returns on T-bills, bonds, and corporate stocks. For bills and stocks, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are zero at standard statistical confidence levels. The coefficients for the population share 75+ are positive (but insignificantly different from zero) for two of the three asset classes, however, for the 1926-1997 period. The pattern for the 1947-1997 sample is the same as that for the longer sample, although the individual coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero.
The results in Table 11 also suggest that including a detailed set of demographic variables can explain a substantial share of the variation in returns, at least for T-bills and for long term government bonds. The explanatory power of the regression equations differs substantially across assets, and the adjusted R 2 values are very low for equity returns. However, as with some of the earlier specifications, the plausibility of the models can be evaluated by studying the predicted values from these equations. Table 12 presents the long-term forecasts that emerge from the estimated equations in the upper panel of Table 11 . The predictions are very strange, especially for corporate stock returns.
The predicted return on stocks in 2030 is 126.8 percent per year, while the associated return on long-term bonds is -29 percent. These predictions are an important warning against the use of specifications like those in Table 11 . When the regression model includes many different trending variables, there is a danger of obtaining a very good in-sample regression fit even though the specification does not accord with the conceptual model that motivates the equation. One warning sign of this situation is out-of-sample predictions that quickly become implausible. Thus, it does not appear that the high in-sample explanatory power of these models for T-bills or for government bond returns represents powerful evidence of a link between demographic factors and asset returns.
International Evidence: Age Structure and Asset Returns in Canada and the United Kingdom
One of the difficulties with analyzing demographic structure and asset returns in a single nation is that there are effectively very few observations on age structure change and financial markets. This is because demographic structure changes very slowly, and because there is substantial persistence in birth rates and mortality rates. One way to partially overcome this problem is to search for data on asset returns in several different markets, and to study the relationship between age structure and returns across nations. This is the approach followed by Brooks (1998) in some of his empirical work.
Relatively few nations have had liquid, developed equity markets for a long period, and investments in corporate stock play a minor role in household portfolios in all but a few nations.
Treating all countries for which it is possible to obtain data on equity values as "equals" in a regression framework may place too much weight on the experience of nations with small equity markets or relatively little individual equity ownership. These issues should be kept in mind when evaluating results from large cross-sectional studies such as Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1997) .
The patterns that emerge from studies of demographic change and asset returns in financial environments that are very different from that in the contemporary United States may not provide much guidance on the potential effects of demographic change on returns in the U.S. and similar markets.
Rather than exploring returns in a wide range of different markets, I have considered the time-series relationship between demographic change and asset returns in two well-developed financial markets: Canada and the United Kingdom. My analysis focuses on equity market returns for the period 1961 -1997 in Canada, and 1961 To avoid presenting the broad range of results that previous tables reported for the United States, I have concentrated my analysis on demographic variables that exhibited some link to asset returns in the U.S. data. My focus in the international analysis is on the relationship between the share of the adult population aged 40-64, or the change in this population share, on returns on bills, bonds, and stocks. The standard errors are particularly large for the specifications that involve differences of the demographic variable, so the confidence intervals would admit a wide range of possible coefficients. For bonds and bills, however, there is some evidence of a positive relationship between both the level of this population share variable, and its change, and returns. For Canada both the level and the difference have statistically significant coefficients, while for the U.K., only the difference specification shows a statistically significant effect. The results using the difference in this demographic variable are similar to those for the United States in the 1947-1997 period, reported in Table 7 . The positive relationship between the level of this demographic share and the level of asset returns for Canada is different from the pattern observed in the United States.
I also estimated (but do not report) regression equations relating asset returns to other demographic variables like those considered above for the United States. (Data limitations presented estimating the "projected asset demand" equations for either nation.) The results relating other demographic variables to asset returns, like those in Table 13 , were similar to those for the United States. Most of the demographic variables did not exhibit a statistically significant correlation with bill, bond, or stock returns. I have also estimated "nonparametric" models like those in Table 11 . The predictions from these equations, like those from the equations for the United States, are frequently outside of the historical range of experience with asset returns. This calls into question the general reliability of these equations, just as the extreme predictions did in the United States case.
Conclusion and Future Directions
This paper explores the relationship between the age structure of the U.S. population, and the average return on various financial assets, during the last seventy years. There is little robust evidence suggesting a historical link between the age structure of the population, or the change in that age structure, and average asset returns. What correlations do emerge are stronger between Treasury bill returns, and long-term government bond returns, and demographic variables, than between stock returns and these demographic variables. Most measures of demographic structure, however, do not show a statistically significant correlation with asset returns. This finding applies to a measure of age-structure induced variation in asset demands, based on information about the typical pattern of asset accumulation as individuals age, as well as to more "mechanical" measures such as the fraction of the population in various age groups.
One possible interpretation of the findings presented here is that even though changes in age structure do affect asset demand, and thereby equilibrium asset returns, these effects are simply too small to be detected amongst the other shocks to asset markets. The strong persistence of demographic structure from year to year also limits the effective variation in the key explanatory variables. One can argue that the U.S. has experienced one demographic shock in the post-war period, and that inferences based on a single observation are necessarily difficult.
The limited information in the historical data on demographic structure and asset returns makes it difficult to provide advice to those who would like to know how to forecast potential rates of return on bonds, stocks, and bills over the next half century. This is made even more difficult because some of the key factors that may mediate the future link between demographic structure and asset returns are difficult to forecast. Perhaps the most important is the development of financial markets in currently "emerging markets," and the linkage between such asset markets and the markets in currently developed nations. Siegel (1998) succinctly presents the issue when he writes that "The developing world emerges as the answer to the age mismatch of the industrialized economies. If their progress continues, they will sell goods to the baby boomers and thereby acquire the buying power to purchase their assets. (page 41)" Changes in the structure of government retirement programs and health insurance arrangements could also have an important effect on prospective age-specific saving rates. If government provision of retirement income declines, this may stimulate saving among younger workers, thereby changing the current agewealth accumulation profile.
The empirical findings reported here suggest several directions for future work. One natural one is to include defined benefit pension assets. The present paper's development of a "projected asset demand" variable included only the assets that individuals purchase directly or through defined contribution pension plans. It excluded accumulations on their behalf in defined benefit plans. These accumulations are a substantial share of total household asset holdings. Another promising direction for further work is the explicit treatment of the complex interactions between demography and asset returns in an asset market with rational expectations. If investors recognize today that the Baby Boom generation's demand for financial assets over the next four decades might affect equilibrium required returns, this information should already be incorporated into the prices of financial claims. Quantifying such effects in a plausibly-calibrated model of asset market equilibrium represents an important, if longer-term, research objective. The goal of such research should be to provide evidence on both the long-run or "steady state" effects of changing fertility patterns on capital-labor ratios and therefore on average returns, as well as the path that asset prices follow in a transition from one demographic steady state to another. A more tightly parameterized model may yield more detailed predictions that can ultimately be tested. Common stock holding includes assets held through defined contribution pension accounts. Net financial assets subtracts mortgage debt and other types of consumer and investment debt from gross financial assets. Net worth is the sum of net financial assets, the gross value of owner-occupied housing, and holdings of other assets such as investment real estate. Estimates are based on regression models that relate real holdings of various assets by age cohorts in different survey years to a set of cohort "intercepts" and indicator variables for various age groups. P25-1130 . Average age over 20 computed using the midpoint in 5-year age intervals as the average age for all persons in that interval, and assuming that the average age for persons 85 and older is 90. R t = α + β*(DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLE) t + ε t or the same specification with ∆(DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLE) t. as the independent variable. The equations are estimated using data for five-year non-overlapping intervals over the period 1926-1997. There are a total of 14 non-overlapping observations. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. For the "level" specification, the dependent and independent variables are five-year averages of the underlying annual variables. For the demographic change specifications, the independent variables are the average annual change over the five-year measurement interval. (1990) or forecasted out-of-sample value from the regression equations shown in the first panel of Table 11 . Standard errors of prediction (for 1990) or forecast (all other years) are shown in parentheses. 
